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Human dignity has a long history in philosophy, theology, 
politics, and jurisprudence.1 Broadly speaking, there are important 
distinctions to be drawn between classical, patristic, medieval, 
reformed, liberal, and postmodern approaches to the concept.  
In the development of ideas about human dignity, three key 
questions have emerged. First, there is the question whether 
dignity is an attribute of certain privileged classes of human  
beings or an attribute of all human beings without distinction.  
Second, there is the question whether human dignity is necessarily 
associated with the possession or exhibition of certain virtues or 
qualities of character. Third, there is the question of the extent to 
which dignity is an attribute of human persons conceived as 
autonomous and atomized individuals or as persons embedded in 
an array of associations and communities. 
 
 * Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Queensland. I wish to express my 
thanks to Frederick Gedicks, Joel Harrison, Christopher McCrudden, Mark Movsesian, 
Andrea Pin, Scott Pryor, and Dmytro Vovk for their comments on an earlier version of this 
paper. My thanks are also due to Father Anastasios Bozikis and John Lee for assistance with 
Greek texts. 
 1. See generally DIGNITY: A HISTORY (Remy Debes ed., 2017). 
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This article will explore the implications of classical, patristic, 
medieval, reformed, liberal, and postmodern approaches for the 
concept of human dignity in respect of each of these three 
questions. It will do so by focusing on the views of an array of 
authors, including Marcus Tullius Cicero, Gregory of Nyssa,  
Leo the Great, Bernard of Clairvaux, Thomas Aquinas, Pico della 
Mirandola, Martin Luther, John Calvin, Johannes Althusius,  
Pope Paul VI, Immanuel Kant, and Friedrich Nietzsche. It will be 
argued that while the older classical conception of dignity 
understood it to be an attribute that distinguished some classes or 
groups of human beings from others, the idea was transformed 
under the influence of Stoic philosophy and especially Christian 
theology into an attribute possessed by all human beings by virtue 
of their created nature. In the patristic, medieval, and reformed 
perspectives, human dignity was understood to be an attribute of 
all human persons, conceived not as autonomous and atomized 
individuals, but as embedded in a great variety of associations and 
communities. As a consequence, dignity was considered to be 
something that can never be separated from one’s moral 
responsibilities as a human being called upon to perform the duties 
associated with one’s particular calling and station in life.  
In modern liberal conceptions of human dignity, however, the idea 
became disassociated from the qualities of one’s character and from 
the associations and communities in which human beings are 
naturally embedded. Defining human dignity solely in terms of 
human freedom and autonomy has resulted in a hollowing, 
flattening and atomizing of human dignity, culminating in the 
postmodern thought of Friedrich Nietzsche in which human 
dignity is reduced to the “will to power,” a condition in which 
“man in himself . . . possesses neither dignity, nor rights, nor 
duties.”2 This “rise and fall” of human dignity gives rise to the 
question whether it can survive the ongoing processes of 
hollowing, flattening, and atomizing that characterize late 
liberalism and post-modernity, and under what conditions it might 
be sustained. 
 
 2. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Greek State—Preface (1871), reprinted in POLITICAL 
WRITINGS OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE: AN EDITED ANTHOLOGY 45 (Frank Cameron & Don 
Dombowsky eds., 2008).  
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I. CLASSICAL DIGNITY 
In a study of ancient Greek attitudes to human worth and value 
as disclosed in the Homeric epics, especially the Iliad and the 
Odyssey, Patrice Rankine has observed: 
Homeric Greeks engaged in ruthless war and acts of pillage, and 
at times mundanely bought and sold persons at a price, as 
slaves. . . . [N]owhere do the epics offer anything like explicit, 
formal criteria of human worth that could be aligned easily to our 
contemporary western notion of dignity. Homeric epics do not 
speak explicitly of an inherent or unearned moral status, which 
status all humans share equally, and which is supposed to ground 
fundamental human rights or protections.3 
For these reasons Rankine argues that the most that might be 
said of the Homeric epics is that they describe a set of practices that 
“can be understood as precursors” to the later development of a 
formal concept of human dignity.4 In the Iliad and Odyssey, the axios 
(worth, value) of human beings varies: it is contingent and 
comparative, not intrinsic; and it is closely related to the prowess 
and fame of a mighty warrior like Hector or Achilles.5 For this 
reason, axios later became associated with a person’s rank or status 
in society and was used in a manner that resembled the term dignitas 
in classical Rome.6 
In Latin usage, the concept of dignitas was closely associated 
with a person’s social standing and with the duties that particularly 
pertained to that status. In the prevailing Roman view, “[h]uman 
beings . . . do not have an automatic and inalienable dignity. Nature 
gives them a role to play, and they must strive to play that role.”7 
Dignity therefore meant “worthiness,” the respect or honor due to 
 
 3. Patrice Rankine, Dignity in Homer and Classical Greece, in DIGNITY: A HISTORY, supra 
note 1, at 20 . 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 22–23. Rankine argues that the encounter between Priam and Achilles (Iliad, 
XXIV.477–84) discloses a certain regard for the common human dignity of the other. 
However, his argument downplays the special heroic status of both characters compared 
with the many other ‘lesser’ human beings in Homer’s narrative. While Achilles’ desecration 
of Hector’s body is portrayed as an extreme breach of propriety, this is because Hector is 
Troy’s preeminent warrior. As Alasdair MacIntyre has pointed out, the martial virtue of 
courage is the cardinal virtue in the Homeric epics. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A 
STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 110 (3d ed. 2007). 
 6. Rankine, supra note 3, at 23–24. 
 7. Miriam Griffin, Dignity in Roman and Stoic Thought, in DIGNITY: A HISTORY, supra 
note 1, at  47, 55 (emphasis omitted). 
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someone on account of their office or rank.8 Moreover, dignity was 
an attribute that attached, not only to individuals in their particular 
duties and offices but also to entire groups and classes. As Miriam 
Griffin explains, “[t]he dignitas of a gens implie[d] [a] family’s 
superiority over other families,” just as ‘[t]he dignitas of the 
equestrian order implie[d] its superiority over the rest of the 
citizenry,” and “[t]he dignitas of the Roman people implie[d] its 
superiority over other peoples.”9 Dignitas was therefore an 
inherently comparative status. The treatment to which a person 
was entitled depended on that person’s social standing. Honors 
were distributed, freedoms conferred, and punishments executed 
in a manner that was proportionate to a person’s rank within 
society. Moreover, each person was expected to live up to that 
social status or lose the marks of respect that went with it. Human 
dignity was more about the privileges and duties associated with a 
particular position in society than it was about the rights inhering 
in all human beings. 
There were, however, some exceptional Roman writers who 
came close to affirming a universal dignity possessed by all human 
beings. Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BC), for example, considered 
that it was unworthy of the superior qualities of human nature 
(dignam hominis praestantia) for human beings to be controlled, like 
brute animals, by desires for sensual gratification.10 Cicero’s 
argument was premised on the qualities of excellence and dignity 
(natura excellentia et dignitas) which he attributed, it seems, to all 
human beings.11 However, he also noted that some human beings 
are so controlled by their desires that they live like beasts, while 
others conceal their appetite for such pleasures so as to avoid the 
shame.12 For Cicero, like Seneca, dignitas was thus still conceived as 
a “sliding scale of worthiness,”13 in which there ought to be a 
“proportion between persons and their dignities.”14 There were 
 
 8. Hubert Cancik, ‘Dignity of Man’ and ‘Persona’ in Stoic Anthropology: Some Remarks 
on Cicero, De Officus I 105–107, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
DISCOURSE 19 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002) . 
 9. Griffin, supra note 7, at 50. 
 10. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS [ON DUTIES], at IXXX.106, at 108–09 (Walter 
Miller trans., 1913). 
 11. But see Kyle Harper, Christianity and the Roots of Human Dignity in Late Antiquity, in 
CHRISTIANITY AND FREEDOM 127–28 (Timothy Shah & Allen Hertzke eds., 2016). 
 12. CICERO, supra note 10, IXXX.105, at 106–07. 
 13. Harper, supra note 11, at 129. 
 14. Harper, supra note 11, at 129. 
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special dignities, inhering in certain offices, which ought also to be 
recognized and preserved. Thus, it was the special office of the 
magistrate to represent the state, to uphold its honor and dignity, 
to enforce the law and to dispense to all their rights, remembering 
that this was committed to him as a sacred trust.15 For Cicero, the 
individual is situated within a system of many concentric circles 
consisting of families, kinship groups, neighborhoods, cities, 
nations, allies, and the human race as a whole (totius complexu gentis 
humanae).16 Although, on this view, there was an important sense 
in which every individual could be regarded as “a citizen of the 
whole universe, as it were of a single city,”17 Cicero’s concern was 
to emphasize the moral duties that attach to one’s place in the 
world, alongside the rights to which one is entitled. Within the 
Roman imperium many of the privileges of citizenship were, over 
time, being extended to formerly subject peoples, but only full 
Roman citizens have political rights.18 
II. PATRISTIC DIGNITY 
There was a sense in which Cicero’s conception of cosmopolitan 
citizenship remained abstracted from local political realities. His 
conception of humanity was universal in theory, but the conditions 
of his time, and his own views about citizenship, prevented its 
political realization.19 The principle of the universal dignity of all 
human beings could not be brought to bear on the particular civic 
identity of each person, for there was no political community which 
was understood to be intrinsically cosmopolitan.20 John Milbank 
has argued that a universal yet concrete polity of this kind only 
came into being with the advent of the Church.21 In his account, the 
Church represented a kind of “alternative polity” (ecclesia) that was 
 
 15. CICERO, supra note 10, I.XXXIV.124, at 126–27. 
 16. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM [ON ENDS], at 
V.XXII.65, at 466–69 (H. Rackham trans., 1914); see also CICERO, supra note 10, I.XVI.50–
I.XVII.55, at 52–59 & III.XVII.69, at 338–41. 
 17. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE LEGIBUS [ON THE LAWS], at I.XXIII.61, at 366–67 
(Clinton W. Keyes trans., 1928). 
 18. Filippo Carlà-Uhink, Alteram Loci Patriam, Aalteram Iuris: “Double Fatherlands” and 
the Role of Italy in Cicero’s Political Discourse, in CITIZENS IN THE GRAECO-ROMAN WORLD 259 
(Lucia Cecchet & Anna Busetto eds., 2017). 
 19. See id. at 266, 272–73, 278. 
 20. John Milbank, Dignity Rather than Rights, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY 189, 
198 (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013). 
 21. Id. at 199. 
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both concrete and universal in the sense that its citizenship was 
open to all human beings without any distinction on the basis of 
nationality, language, status, or sex. 
This did not mean that human dignity came to be conceived 
only as an abstract property possessed equally by all. The biblical 
teaching that all human beings are made in the image and likeness 
of God22  became a mainstay of Christian reflection on human nature, 
but this was framed within the doctrines of creation, fall, and 
redemption. Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335–95), in his treatise On the 
Making of Man, taught that human beings are created in the likeness 
of “the King of all,” and are therefore made to exercise beneficent 
rule over the creation: “clothed in virtue,” “decked with the crown 
of righteousness,” and bearing the “dignity of royalty” (τῆϛ 
βασιλείαϛ ἀξιώματι).23 This dignity, he taught, applies to “all 
mankind” for all “equally bear in themselves the Divine image.”24 
Indeed, everything has dignity by virtue of its creation by God, 
“from the angels in heaven . . . to the lowest earthly things.”25 And 
yet, there is a “difference of dignity” as between men and animals 
indicated by the upright bearing in which human beings stand 
erect.26 In human beings, the Divine image is in the human nous, the 
rational faculty that enables human beings to be self-determining 
creatures that possess the dignity of personhood.27 This did not 
mean that dignity was the preserve only of the wise or learned. 
Gregory was very clear that the poor, no matter how abject their 
poverty, are worthy of the respect and dignity due to them as 
creatures bearing the imago Dei.28 For “[w]e are all of the same stock, 
all brothers and sisters.”29 As a consequence of the fall from the 
state of innocence, however, Gregory taught that the divine image 
has been distorted and can only be fully restored by being remade 
 
 22. Genesis 1:27. 
 23. GREGORY OF NYSSA, On the Making of Man, in 5 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS 
OF THE CHURCH, SECOND SERIES, at IV.1 (H.A. Wilson trans., Philip Schaff & Henry Wace  
eds., 1893). 
 24. Id. at XVI.16–17. 
 25. Bonnie Kent, In the Image of God: Human Dignity after the Fall, in DIGNITY: A 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 78. 
 26. GREGORY OF NYSSA, supra note 23, VIII.1. 
 27. Vladimir Lossky, The Theological Notion of the Human Person, in IN THE IMAGE AND 
LIKENESS OF GOD 119–20 (1974). 
 28. GREGORY OF NYSSA, On the Love of the Poor, in WEALTH AND POVERTY IN EARLY 
CHRISTIANITY 71, 73 (Helen Rhee ed., 2017). 
 29. Id. at 74. 
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by the grace of God into the likeness of Christ. This restoration of 
the “grace of the image” intrinsically involves a restoration of the 
“dignity of rule” (τῆϛ ἀρχῆϛ ἀξία).30 Thus, the work of Christ 
provides a double reason for human dignity, even for the most 
poor, for Christ has given himself for the sake of even the very 
poorest of His brethren, and they have, so to speak, “taken upon 
themselves” the person of their Savior.31 
In the Latin usage of late antiquity, dignitas continued to be a 
term that could designate the status or standing of those who held 
specific stations in life, and it could also be used in respect of entire 
institutions, such as the Church itself. Consistent with this usage, 
Pope Leo I (c. 400–61) wrote of the dignity which God has given 
both to the churches and their priests,32 and recognized ranks of 
dignity among the priesthood, distinguishing, for example, the 
“grade of deacon” (diaconi gradum), the “honor of the presbytery” 
(presbyterii honorem), and the “the highest rank of the bishopric” 
(episcopatus culmen ascendat).33 However, like Gregory of Nyssa, he 
also associated dignity with the creation of human beings in the 
image of God. For Leo, “our race attains its highest natural dignity” 
(naturalem nostri generis dignitatem) when the “form of the Divine 
goodness” is reflected in us.34 Leo’s focus here was on the privileges 
available to all through the grace of God in Christ and the dignity 
that can be realized through partnership in the Divine nature.35  
At their creation, human beings possessed the “high dignity” of 
being created in the image of God in “goodness and 
righteousness.”36 So, likewise, the “chosen and royal race” of those 
saved by God in Christ “must live up to the dignity of [their] 
regeneration.”37 And to do this, the spirit must overcome the flesh, 
 
 30. GREGORY OF NYSSA, supra note 23, XXI.4, at 36. 
 31.  GREGORY OF NYSSA, supra note 28, at 73. 
 32. LEO I, Letter X, in 12 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN 
CHURCH, at II, at 9 (Henry Wace & Philip Schaff eds., 1895). 
 33. LEO I, Letter XII, in id. III, at 13; Sancti Leonis Magni Romani Pontificis Epistolae, 
reprinted in PATROLOGIA LATINA 581 (Jacques-Paul Migne ed., 1846). 
 34. LEO I, Sermon XII, in 12 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN 
CHURCH, supra note 32, I, at 121; Sancti Leonis Magni Pontificis Romani Sermones, reprinted in 
54 PATROLOGIAE LATINAE 138 (Jacques-Paul Migne ed., 1881). 
 35. LEO I, Sermon XXI, in 12 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN 
CHURCH, supra note 32, II, at 129. 
 36. LEO I, Sermon XXIV, in id. II, at 135. 
 37. LEO I, Sermon XXVI, in id. III, at 138. 
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thereby upholding the “dignity of its rule” over the body.38 As Leo 
put it in one of his sermons: “Awake, O man, and recognize the 
dignity of your nature. Recollect [you were] made in the image  
of God, which although it was corrupted in Adam, was yet  
re-fashioned in Christ.”39 For Leo, human dignity derives from the 
dignity of God, an attribute possessed equally by the three persons 
of the Holy Trinity.40 Human nature has a dignity that exceeds that 
of all the “heavenly creatures,” for it has been united with the 
Divine nature in the person of the Son of God and is therefore 
associated with the Eternal Father “on the throne with His glory.”41 
All human beings share, in principle, in this “uplifting” of human 
nature through its union with God through the “Incarnation of  
the Word.”42 
III. MEDIEVAL DIGNITY 
In medieval jurisprudence the term dignitas developed an 
increasingly technical meaning in which it designated a quality that 
attached to high offices such as king and duke, pope and bishop.43 
But while many medieval works discussed “the dignity of God or 
Christ, the angels, Christ’s followers, or kings, bishops, priests, and 
other people with special offices,” several important texts also 
expanded on the dignity that all human beings have because they 
are created in the Divine image.44 In his treatise On Loving God, 
Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) understood dignity, alongside 
knowledge and virtue, to be the first of the three attributes of our 
“higher nature,” the quality that distinguishes human beings from 
non-sentient animals.45 Dignity, for Bernard, is intrinsically 
associated with free-will (liberum arbitrium), the attribute by which 
human beings excel all other earthly creatures and the reason why 
they have dominion over them. Knowledge involves a two-fold 
 
 38. LEO I, Sermon XLII, in id. II, at 156. 
 39. LEO I, Sermon XXVII, in id. VI, at 141; see also Kent, supra note 25. 
 40. LEO I, Sermon LXXII, in 12 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN 
CHURCH, supra note 32, V, at 185. 
 41. LEO I, Sermon LXXIII, in id. III, at 187. 
 42. LEO I, Sermon LXXVII, in id. V, at 193. 
 43. ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIAEVAL 
POLITICAL THEOLOGY 383–450 (1957). 
 44. Kent, supra note 25, at 73–74. 
 45. BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX, ON LOVING GOD, ch. II, at 4 (n.d.), https://ccel.org/ccel/ 
bernard/loving_god/loving_god (last visited Feb. 11, 2021). 
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capacity: to recognize the dignity possessed by all human beings 
and to understand that it is essentially a gift rather than an 
accomplishment. Virtue, in turn, is the quality that impels human 
beings to seek for and adhere to the Divine source and author of 
these good gifts. Bernard emphasized that all three qualities are of 
vital importance. Dignity, although a “peculiar eminence” 
naturally enjoyed by all human beings, is worthless without 
knowledge, and harmful without virtue.46 When men lack wisdom, 
they are prone to two errors, he said. The first leads them captive 
to merely sensual things and makes them comparable to irrational 
beasts. The second causes them to glory in their dignity, forgetting 
that it is a gift given to them by God, thereby usurping the glory 
that is due to Him alone. For this reason, Bernard stressed the 
importance of adding virtue to dignity and knowledge. He put it 
this way: 
Who is so impious as to attribute the peculiar eminence of 
humanity to any other except to Him who saith, in Genesis, ‘Let 
us make man in Our image, after Our likeness’? (Gen. 1.26). Who 
else could be the Bestower of wisdom, but He that teacheth man 
knowledge? (Ps. 94.10). Who else could bestow virtue except the 
Lord of virtue? Therefore even the infidel who knows not Christ 
but does at least know himself, is bound to love God for God’s 
own sake. He is unpardonable if he does not love the Lord his God 
with all his heart, and with all his soul, and with all his mind;  
for his own innate justice and common sense cry out from within  
that he is bound wholly to love God, from whom he has received 
all things.47 
Here Bernard gave expression to the prevailing medieval 
understanding of the imago Dei as involving both intellectual 
capacities and moral dispositions. All people have the inner 
knowledge that they are bound wholly to love God, but achieving 
this is difficult to the point of impossibility for any man to achieve 
“by his own strength” and through “the power of [his] free-will.”48 
The fall has disordered our natural dispositions and capacities, and 
they can only fully be restored by the grace of God. 
Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) took these themes further. Like 
Bernard, he considered the image of God to consist in our creation 
 
 46. Id. at 5. 
 47. Id. at 5–6. 
 48. Id. at 5. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:5 (2021) 
1220 
as intelligent beings endowed with free will and self-movement.49 
This capacity, on his view, is simultaneously a faculty of reason and 
a faculty of will that is properly directed towards truth, goodness 
and, ultimately, beatitude. Following Peter Lombard (1096-1160), 
he considered all human beings to be gifted with the “faculty of 
reason and will, through which good is chosen with grace assisting, 
or evil with grace desisting.”50 This faculty is accordingly also “a 
power, progressively formed in us, to produce moral acts of 
excellence.”51 Bad choices are not fully acts of freedom, for they 
involve a kind of bondage to sensual cravings rather than decisions 
directed by reason and oriented to that which is truly good. 
Many of the hundreds of Aquinas’s references to dignitas in his 
works reflect the diverse senses of the term derived from general 
classical and medieval usage.52 His most consequential discussion 
of the matter appeared, however, in his consideration of what it 
means to be a “person,” especially in relation to the Christian 
doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation.53 Following Boethius, 
Aquinas defined “person” as an “individual substance of a rational 
nature.”54 Noting that the term persona had been used to designate 
the theatrical portrayal of prominent city dignitaries, he argued it 
was therefore fitting to use the term to designate the divine persons 
of the Trinity. Observing that “subsistence in a rational nature” is a 
 
 49. As Servais Pinckaers points out, Aquinas’s discussion of the image of God was 
positioned at the pivotal point in the Summa Theologiae where he turned from theology to 
anthropology. See Servais Pinckaers, Ethics and the Image of God, in THE PINCKAERS READER: 
RENEWING THOMISTIC MORAL THEOLOGY 130, 132–33 (John Berkman & Craig Steven Titus 
eds., 2005); see also THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, II. Prologue, at 609 (Burns, Oates 
& Washbourne trans., 1947–48, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. 1990) (1485) (“Since, as 
Damascene states (De Fide Orthod. ii, 12), man is said to be made to God’s image, in so far as 
the image implies an intelligent being endowed with free will and self-movement, now that 
we have treated of the exemplar, that is, of God, and of those things which came forth from 
the power of God in accordance with His will, it remains for us to treat of His image, that is, 
man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free will and control of his 
actions.”) [hereinafter SUMMA THEOLOGIAE]; THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, II. 
Prologue (Burns, Oates & Washbourne trans., 1947–48) (1485) [hereinafter SUMMA 
THEOLOGIAE (Burns, Oates & Washbourne trans.)]. 
 50. Pinckaers, supra note 49, at 137 (quoting Peter Lombard, SENTENTIARUM LIBRI 
QUATTUOR 452 (1971)). 
 51. Id. at 138. 
 52. See Servais Pinckaers, Aquinas on the Dignity of the Human Person, in THE PINCKAERS 
READER: RENEWING THOMISTIC MORAL THEOLOGY, supra note 49, at 144, 146. 
 53. For a discussion of its earlier use, see Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Concerning the 
Notion of Person in Theology, 17 COMMUNIO: INT’L CATHOLIC REV. 439 (1990). 
 54. SUMMA THEOLOGIAE (Burns, Oates & Washbourne trans.), supra note 49, I.29.1, at 25. 
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status “of high dignity,” Aquinas considered that the same honor 
of personhood should be extended to every individual who 
possesses a rational nature.55 As Servais Pinckaers has observed, 
this enabled Aquinas to continue to use the term dignitas to 
designate the high personages of medieval civil and ecclesiastical 
society, but also to use the term persona to designate every human 
being, since everyone possesses the dignity of human nature.56 As 
a consequence, all human beings were considered to have dignitas 
in this basic sense, but they may become more dignified to the 
extent that they better come to resemble the divine personality.57 
According to Aquinas, it was due to both its dignity and its 
fallenness that human nature was a fitting candidate for union with 
the divine nature in the Incarnation.58 The dignity of human nature 
consists in its rationality and its capacity to know and love God, 
whereas the fallenness of human nature consists in its defection 
from the Divine image in which it has been created. It followed for 
Aquinas that the union of human nature with the divine nature 
elevated it to an even higher dignity than could be secured if 
humanity were conceived merely in itself, let alone in its fallen 
state, without any relationship to God. Thus, Aquinas observed 
that one of the lessons of the Incarnation is “how great is man’s 
dignity, lest we should sully it by sin.”59 
In this way the whole point of human dignity was, for Aquinas, 
entirely moral and theological. As Pinckaers has pointed out, the 
result was a threefold conception: first, the basic and ineradicable 
dignity possessed by all human beings due to their rational 
capacity to know and love God; second, the inherent potential for 
growth and development in virtue through the course of a life lived 
under the influence of divine grace; and third, the perfect 
knowledge and love of God that may be secured in the heavenly 
beatitude, the ultimate human destiny.60 In this theological context, 
while sin can never destroy the inherent dignity of the human 
person, it does diminish our natural inclinations to virtue, truth, 
and goodness, and therefore causes us to “fall away” from our 
 
 55. Id. I.29.3, at 33. 
 56. Pinckaers, supra note 52, at 151. 
 57. Id. at 152. 
 58. SUMMA THEOLOGIAE (Burns, Oates & Washbourne trans.), supra note 49, III.4.1, at 72. 
 59. SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 49, III.1.2, at 704; see also THOMAS AQUINAS, 
SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, at IV.54 (Joseph Rickaby ed. & trans., 1905). 
 60. Pinckaers, supra note 52, at 158. 
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original created dignity, and to “fall into” the “slavish state of  
the beasts.”61 Sinful human beings are therefore deserving of 
punishment for their sins, not because they have become irrational 
animals in their essential nature, but because they have the high 
dignity of human nature and therefore possess the capacity to 
choose between good and evil. Given the extraordinary powers of 
human beings to use their rational capacities rightly or wrongly, 
Aquinas’s observation was blunt and to the point: “a bad man is 
worse than a beast, and is more harmful.”62 
A significant difference in tone, framing, and orientation 
characterizes the so-called Oration on Human Dignity written by the 
Italian Renaissance philosopher Pico della Mirandola (1463–94). 
For Pico, the dignity of man consists in his status as a “creature of 
indeterminate image” (opus indiscretae imaginis).63 This means that, 
unlike all other creatures, human beings determine their own 
natures acording to their own free will, mimicking the creative 
freedom of God, fashioning themselves into whatever form they 
individually prefer.64 The divine creation was thus central to Pico’s 
conception of human dignity, but he drew substantially not only on 
the account of the creation in the book of Genesis but on Plato’s 
Symposium and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite’s De mystica 
theologia.65 Man is a creature who is “permitted to obtain what he 
desires and to be what he wills.”66 What he ought to pursue is the 
highest “dignity and glory” of the angelic beings,67 first by curbing 
the passions and cleansing the soul of ignorance and vice, and then 
by imbuing the purified soul with the light of natural philosophy, 
so that it may be ready to be perfected with the knowledge of things 
Divine.68 For man’s mystical calling is to realize the full potentiality 
of his nature through moral transformation, intellectual study, and 
final perfection through identification with the Divine, a state of 
 
 61. SUMMA THEOLOGIAE (Burns, Oates & Washbourne trans.), supra note 49, II.II.64.2, 
at 199. 
 62. Id.; see J. BUDZISZEWSKI, COMPANION TO THE COMMENTARY ON THOMAS AQUINAS’S 
TREATISE ON LAW 160–66 (2014). 
 63. GIOVANNI PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, ORATION ON THE DIGNITY OF MAN: A NEW 
TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY 53 (Francesco Borghesi et al. eds. & trans., 2012). 
 64. Id. at 70; Francesco Borghesi, Interpretations, in id. at 53–54. 
 65. Francesco Borghesi & Massimo Riva, Overview of the Text, in id. 67–69. 
 66. Id. § 24, at 119. 
 67. Id. § 49, at 135 
 68. Id. §§ 71–72, at 143. 
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being which transcends all images and representations.69 However, 
human freedom is such that human beings may choose not to 
ascend to such heights, degenerating into a lower, brutish form of 
life.70 The question is what path each human being will choose:  
a barely sentient life analogous to that of plants and animals, or the 
higher intellectual and contemplative life of angelic beings. Pico 
concludes: “Who, then, will not admire man?”71 
IV. PROTESTANT DIGNITY 
Protestant theologians and jurists built on patristic and medieval 
ideas about human nature and human dignity, but developed them 
in directions that reflected several distinctive doctrines of the 
Reformation.72 Martin Luther (1483–1546) in particular highlighted 
the egalitarian and liberating dimensions of the concept of human 
dignity. In his Freedom of the Christian Man (1520),73 he taught that 
Christ imparts to every believer the dual dignities of kingship and 
priesthood, understood not in a corporeal sense of exercising 
temporal or coercive power, but in a spiritual sense of enabling 
Christians to live in freedom from fear of death or persecution, and 
in having direct and personal access to God in Christ.74 The “honor 
and dignity” (Ehre und Würde), indeed “very high and honorable 
dignity” (sehr hohe, ehrenvolle Würde), attached to these offices,75 
makes every Christian simultaneously “the most free lord of all, 
and subject to none” and “the most dutiful servant of all, and 
subject to every one.”76 All Christians, regardless of their status in 
society, enjoy the same essential freedom in Christ. As John Witte 
has pointed out, this proposition could be taken to imply a far-
 
 69. Francesco Borghesi, Interpretations, in id. 59–60. 
 70. Id. § 23, at 117. 
 71. Id. § 41, at 133. 
 72. See generally JOHN WITTE, LAW AND PROTESTANTISM: THE LEGAL TEACHINGS OF THE 
LUTHERAN REFORMATION (2002) (investigating the relationship between the law and religious 
doctrine in Luther’s Germany); JOHN WITTE, THE REFORMATION OF RIGHTS: LAW, RELIGION, AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN EARLY MODERN CALVINISM (2007) [hereinafter WITTE, REFORMATION OF 
RIGHTS] (tracing Calvinism’s influence on Western law in early modern Europe). 
 73. Martin Luther, Concerning Christian Liberty, in JOHN MURRAY, FIRST PRINCIPLES OF 
THE REFORMATION 104 (Henry Wace & C.A. Buckheim eds., 1885) (1520) [hereinafter Luther, 
Concerning Christian Liberty]. 
 74. Id. at 115. 
 75. Id.; MARTIN LUTHER, VON DER FREIHEIT EINES CHRISTENMENSCHEN § 15 
(Wittenberg, Johann Rhau-Grunenberg 1520), http://digitale.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/urn/ 
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:1-473882 (last visited Sept. 23, 2020). 
 76. Luther, Concerning Christian Liberty, supra note 73, at 104. 
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reaching egalitarianism, for it suggests that “a lowly Augustinian 
monk from an obscure German town [might] address His Holiness 
Leo X as if he were the pope’s equal.”77 While Luther in his later 
writings resisted some of the more radical implications of this idea 
in his responses to the excesses of the Peasants’ Revolt (1525),  
as well as the antinomian experiments of some Anabaptist groups, 
these ideas made many Protestants fervent believers in the 
proposition that by faith the Christian believer is “free from all law, 
and in perfect freedom does gratuitously all that he does . . . which 
is well-pleasing to God.”78 
At the same time, while Protestant theologians continued to 
understand human dignity to be grounded in the creation of all 
human beings in the Divine image, they tended to place more 
emphasis on the fallenness of human nature and its dependence on 
divine grace for its restoration than their Catholic counterparts. 
John Calvin (1509–64), for example, certainly affirmed the 
“primeval dignity” 79 and “original excellence and nobility” 80 given 
to human beings at their creation, but he also reflected on the “sad 
spectacle of our ignominy and corruption.”81 The “hereditary 
corruption and depravity of [human] nature,” which Calvin, 
following Augustine, called “original sin,” characterizes all human 
beings without distinction.82 Calvin taught that due consideration 
of our fallen state should humble us and inspire us with “new 
desires to seek after God, in whom each may regain those good 
qualities of which all are found to be utterly destitute,” and thereby 
be “raised to royal dignity.”83 Like many theologians before him, 
Calvin understood the “highest perfection of dignity” to subsist in 
 
 77. John Witte, Between Sanctity and Depravity: Human Dignity in Early Protestant 
Perspective, in  IN DEFENSE OF HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS FOR OUR TIMES 119 (Robert P. Kraynak 
& Glenn Tinder eds., 2003) [hereinafter Witte, Between Sanctity and Depravity]. 
 78.  Luther, Concerning Christian Liberty, supra note 73, at 122. 
 79. JOHN CALVIN, THE INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, at II.I.3, at 212 (Henry 
Beveridge trans., Christian Classics Ethereal Library (c. 2007)) (1536), [hereinafter CALVIN, 
INSTITUTES (Beveridge trans.)], https://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html. 
 80. JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, at  II.VI.1, at 340 (Ford Lewis 
Battles trans., Westminster Press 1960) (1536). 
 81. CALVIN, INSTITUTES (Beveridge trans.), supra note 79, II.I.1, at 210. 
 82. Id. II.I.8, at 217. As the Catholic publicist G.K. Chesterton (no friend of Calvin) once 
quipped, original sin is not a doctrine of the superiority of one category of human being over 
another; rather, it encourages a sense of “pathos and brotherhood, and a thunder of laughter 
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GILBERT K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 292 (1909). 
 83. CALVIN, INSTITUTES (Beveridge trans.), supra note 79, II.I.3, at 211 & II.VII.1, at 301. 
1225 The Rise and Fall of Human Dignity 
 1225 
our union with God,84 recalling the creation of man as the 
“preeminent specimen of Divine wisdom, justice, and goodness.”85 
He also taught that it is the “beauty and dignity” of the Divine 
image in human beings that motivates us to treat others with justice 
and forbearance.86 
John Witte has argued that this belief in the equal dignity of all 
Christian believers was an important impetus for later Protestant 
jurists to translate the moral duties owed by all human beings to 
one another into the correlative rights of every human person.87 
Thus, the commands contained in the Decalogue that we must not 
kill, commit adultery, steal, or bear false witness against our 
neighbor88 were translated into the corresponding rights of our 
neighbor to life, property, fidelity, and reputation.89 One example 
of this tendency is seen in the work of the Calvinist jurist  
Johannes Althusius (1557–1638), who understood adherence to the 
correlative duties and rights of the Decalogue to be a matter of 
human dignity. 
Like many Protestant jurists, Althusius considered the Ten 
Commandments to set forth the organizing principles of the ideal 
Reformed Christian polity.90 Following traditional exegesis, he 
distinguished between the “First Table” of the Decalogue as 
containing the duties human beings owe to God and the “Second 
Table” as stipulating the duties we owe to each other, but he further 
argued that the duties of the Second Table imply the existence of 
correlative rights.91 Thus, for example, the duty not to steal the 
property of one’s neighbor necessarily entails the right of our 
neighbor to the possession of his lawful property. Moreover, 
Althusius considered that the underlying purpose of the correlative 
 
 84. Id. II.XII.6, at 405. 
 85. 1 JOHN CALVIN, COMMENTARIES ON THE FIRST BOOK OF MOSES CALLED GENESIS § 1(26) 
(John King trans., 1847) (1578), https://ccel.org/ccel/c/calvin/calcom01/cache/calcom01.pdf. 
 86. CALVIN, INSTITUTES (Beveridge trans.), supra note 79, III.VII.6, at 580. 
 87. Witte, Between Sanctity and Depravity, supra note 77, at 133–34. 
 88. Exodus 20:13–16; Deuteronomy 5:17–20. 
 89. Witte, Between Sanctity and Depravity, supra note 77, at 133–34. 
 90. For more detail, see WITTE, REFORMATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 72, at 143–207. 
 91. JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS, POLITICA: AN ABRIDGED TRANSLATION OF POLITICS 
METHODICALLY SET FORTH AND ILLUSTRATED WITH SACRED AND PROFANE EXAMPLES at X.6, at 
80–81 (Frederick S. Carney ed. & trans., Liberty Fund, Inc. 1995) (1603) [hereinafter 
ALTHUSIUS, POLITICA (Carney trans.)]; JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS, POLITICA METHODICE DIGESTA 
ET EXEMPLIS SACRIS ET PROFANES ILLUSTRATA (1603) (Latin text version) [hereinafter ALTHUSIUS, 
POLITICA (Latin text)]. 
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rights and duties of the Decalogue was to protect and preserve 
human dignity (conservanda dignitate hominis).92 Reflecting on the 
duties we owe to our neighbors, he observed:  
Thus we render to him honor, authority, dignity, preeminence, 
and, indeed, the right of family; nor do we, on the contrary, 
despise him or hold him in contempt, the fifth precept of the 
Decalogue. His life is to be defended and conserved, and his body 
may not be injured, hurt, struck, or treated in any inhumane way 
whatever, nor may the liberty and use of his body be diminished 
or taken away, the sixth precept. His chastity is to be left intact, 
free from fornication, and may not be taken away in any manner 
whatever, the seventh precept. His goods and their possession, use, 
and ownership are to be conserved, and they may not be injured, 
diminished, or taken away, the eighth precept. His reputation and 
good name are to be protected, and they may not be taken away, 
injured, or reduced by insults, lies, or slander, the ninth precept. 
And so one may not covet those things that belong to another, 
either by deliberation or by passion, but everything our neighbor 
possesses he is to use and enjoy free from the passion of our 
concupiscence and perverse desire.93  
Notably, in Althusius’s analysis, the ninth precept was 
particularly directed to the preservation of the reputation and good 
name of one’s neighbor. Elsewhere he observed that the rights 
enjoyed by one’s neighbor include the following: 
[F]irst, his natural life, including the liberty and safety of his own 
body. The opposite of these are terror, murder, injury, wounds, 
beatings, compulsion, slavery, fetters, and coercion. Secondly, the 
neighbor possesses his reputation, good name, honor, and 
dignity, which are called the “second self” of man. Opposed to 
them are insult, ill repute, and contempt. . . . Also pertaining to 
this category are the right of family, and the right of citizenship 
that belongs to some. Thirdly, a man has external goods that he 
uses and enjoys, opposed to which are the corruption, damage, 
and impairing of his goods in any form, as well as their 
plundering or robbery, and any violation of their possession or 
artificial impediment to their use.94  
In this discussion, dignity is something both rightly possessed 
by and properly accorded to one’s neighbor, alongside his honor 
 
 92. ALTHUSIUS, POLITICA (Latin text), supra note 91, XVI, at 206. 
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 94. Id. X.6, at 80–81. 
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and reputation, and the duty to uphold the dignity of our neighbor 
is indissolubly associated with the full ensemble of rights to which 
he is personally entitled.  
Althusius presented much of this material in the context of his 
discussion of the civil order of the commonwealth. This civil order, 
he said, provides the political context in which “the necessary and 
convenient means for carrying on a common life of justice together 
are communicated” among the members of a society.95 However, 
for Althusius, the members of the commonwealth are not merely 
individuals. The commonwealth is a mixed society consisting of 
“many symbiotic associations and particular bodies . . . brought 
together under one right.”96 These associations and bodies are 
variously “private, natural, necessary, and voluntary” as well as 
“public,” and they include “families, cities, and provinces.”97 The 
reason for this is that, according to Althusius, human society 
develops “by the definite steps and progressions of small 
societies,”98 for families, cities, and provinces “existed by nature 
prior to realms, and gave birth to them.”99 
By Althusius’s account, our first and most fundamental 
associations are the families into which we are born and within 
which we are nurtured. The deep personal bonds of this “most 
intense” form of society constitute “the seedbed of every other 
symbiotic association.”100 It follows that husband and wife will 
share the same family name, the same rank (dignitatum), the same 
status, and the same condition.101 Next, and beyond the natural and 
necessary bonds of families and kinship groups, the second 
important category of human association are the civil and voluntary 
associations that Althusius called collegia.102 He considered this 
category of human sociability to be very various and extensive: 
[T]here are collegia of bakers, tailors, builders, merchants, coiners 
of money, as well as philosophers, theologians, government 
officials, and others that every city needs for the proper 
functioning of its social life. Some of these collegia are 
 
 95. Id. X.1, at 79. 
 96. Id. IX.1, at 66. 
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ecclesiastical and sacred, instituted for the sake of divine things; 
others are secular and profane, instituted for the sake of human 
things. The first are collegia of theologians and philosophers.  
The second are collegia of magistrates and judges, and of various 
craftsmen, merchants, and rural folk.103 
These associations, although voluntary, constitute the building 
blocks of every political community. The first of the specifically 
political associations, for Althusius, is the city, which he observed 
is “an association formed by fixed laws and composed of many 
families and collegia living in the same place.”104 Here there is again 
variety and a progression from small and local to relatively larger 
and more extended, in a succession of nested distinctions between 
hamlets, villages, towns, and cities,105 for even the fully developed 
city is conceived as an association of hamlets and villages.106 Next, 
there is the province, which “contains within its territory many 
villages, towns, outposts, and cities united under the communion 
and administration of one right (ius).”107 And finally, there is the 
“universal and major public association,” which is formed when 
“many cities and provinces obligate themselves to hold, organize, 
use, and defend, through their common energies and expenditures, 
the right of the realm (ius regni) in the mutual communication of 
things and services.”108 
All of these associations, from the private and voluntary to the 
public and compulsory, despite their diversity, are subject to the 
same principle of symbiosis, which is an organic-like relationship 
that involves “mutual communication of whatever is useful and 
necessary for the harmonious exercise of social life.”109 
Thus: ”[c]ommunication among citizens of the same community 
for the purpose of self-sufficiency and symbiosis pertains to things, 
services, right, and mutual concord.”110 Nonetheless: 
 Concord is fostered and protected by fairness (aequabilitas) 
when right, liberty, and honor are extended to each citizen 
according to the order and distinction of his worth and status.  
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For it behooves the citizen to live by fair and suitable right with 
his neighbor, displaying neither arrogance nor servility, and thus 
to will whatever is tranquil and honest in the city. Contrary to this 
fairness is equality (aequalitas), by which individual citizens are 
levelled among themselves . . . .111 
In this complex way, Althusius considered dignitas to be 
foundational to the rights of all human beings—a quality enjoyed 
by all equally—and yet it was also, in another sense, a quality that 
might be variously distributed within a society in proportion to the 
specific roles and offices held by each member. Dignity and honor 
are owed to everyone within the commonwealth, but there are also 
degrees of authority, dignity, and honor distributed among citizens 
in order to preserve proper order.  
The term dignitas thus continued to retain much of the varied 
and relative meaning it had in classical Latin, and it was therefore 
used to designate what today might be called the special “honors” 
that are accorded to individuals in view of their particular roles or 
contributions to the good of the community. Also, importantly, 
Althusius understood the concept of dignity in the context of a rich 
social ontology in which not only individuals, but also families, 
collegia, cities, and provinces, are the constituent members of the 
political order as a whole. Those who hold office within the 
commonwealth are therefore bound to exercise their powers in 
accordance with their particular vocations and duties.112 The due 
performance of these responsibilities (munera) are the “bonds and 
nerves,” he explained, “by which so great a conjunction of diverse 
bodies is held together and conserved.”113 
V. CATHOLIC AND ORTHODOX DIGNITY 
Russell Hittinger has drawn attention to similar themes in 
contemporary Catholic social teaching, particularly in relation to 
what has become known as the munus regale—the function, 
mission, gift, or vocation of ruling. The munus regale, Hittinger 
explains, originated in theological reflection on the offices of Christ 
as prophet, priest, and king, and the recognition that all Christians 
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participate in these munera by virtue of their baptism.114  
All individual human beings are the recipients of manifold divine 
gifts or talents which constitute their calling or vocation and they 
exercise these munera in all of the diverse spheres of life, such that 
even the associations themselves—families, corporations, churches, 
states—are said to have munera, together with the rights (ius) 
necessary in order to fulfil their distinctive callings.115 As a 
consequence, human rights find their rationale in the munera and 
are expressed through a plurality of social forms.116 
The totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century attempted to 
deprive these societies—families, trade unions, religious orders, 
and so on—of their legal personality and independence. Pius XI 
(1922–39) responded by making clear, as Hittinger explains, that 
rights are not derived from human nature “abstractly considered” 
but rather flow from a human nature already bearing and 
exhibiting a social ontology. Accordingly, negative rights 
(immunities) are not the logical starting point of rights, but rather 
exist in order to safeguard antecedent munera. The common good 
thus has a “manifold organicity.”117 On this view, the role of the state 
is not primarily distributive, but rather facilitative and supportive. 
The state recognizes and supports an existing distribution of 
munera that is already contributing to the common good in 
manifold ways—through families, schools, hospitals, charities and 
so forth. It is in this light that the principle of subsidiarity must be 
understood.118 Every human being—as a person created in the 
imago Dei—has been given a unique set of gifts and is called to a 
particular vocation which is inherently relational and social.  
And it is in this that human dignity consists. As Benedict XVI put it 
in Caritas in Veritate, “[s]ubsidiarity respects personal dignity  
by recognizing in the person a subject who is always capable of  
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giving something to others.”119 And as the Second Vatican Council  
taught, the human dignity that is the foundation of all human  
rights is a quality that reflects the social and communal nature of 
human beings.120 
In Dignitatis Humanae (1965), Pope Paul VI articulated the 
judgement of the Vatican Council that contemporary efforts to 
secure human dignity through constitutional limits on the powers 
of government and protections of the rightful freedoms of persons 
and associations are “greatly in accord with truth and justice.”121 
The Pope emphasized, however, that this must be understood as a 
“responsible freedom,” grounded on the dignity of the human 
person as known through the revealed word of God and by reason 
itself, and appropriate to our “social nature.”122 The encyclical 
emphasized that this social nature of human beings gives rise to the 
formation of several social organizations, especially religious 
communities and families, alongside many other “social groups.”123 
This accent on the social and especially communal orientation 
of human nature is even more pronounced in Eastern Orthodox 
teachings on human dignity. The Russian Orthodox Church’s Basic 
Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights (2008) grounds 
human dignity in the creation of human beings in the divine image 
and the fact that the Lord Jesus Christ assumed human nature in its 
fullness except for sin.124 Citing Gregory of Nyssa, the teaching of 
the Church is that human beings realize their fullest dignity in 
being filled with the goodness of God.125 Accordingly, while a 
“morally undignified life does not ruin the God-given dignity 
ontologically,” it “darkens it so much as to make it hardly 
discernible.”126 This darkening of the divine image—or else its 
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illumination—depends on the “self-determination of the free 
individual,” for freedom is “one of the manifestations of God in 
human nature.”127 And yet freedom of choice is not an “absolute or 
ultimate value,” for it ought to be placed “at the service of human 
well-being.”128 The abuse of freedom through the choice of an 
immoral way of life “will ultimately destroy the very freedom of 
choice as it leads the will to slavery by sin.”129 Accordingly, there 
are two freedoms, both of which should be guiding principles of a 
society: “Free adherence to goodness and the truth is impossible 
without the freedom of choice, just as a free choice loses its value 
and meaning if it is made in favour of evil.”130 
This reasoning gives rise to what appears to be a point of 
departure from Catholic teaching on the topic.131 While the Russian 
Orthodox Church affirms that “every individual is endowed by 
God with dignity and freedom,” it also insists that human rights 
“cannot be superior to the values of the spiritual world.”132  
A society should therefore order its life in a manner that takes into 
account both human interests and divine truth; human rights 
“should be harmonized with the norms of [religious] morality.”133 
Even more pointedly: human rights “should not contradict love for 
one’s homeland and neighbours.”134 Particular civilizations “ought 
not to impose their own way of life on other civilizations under the 
pretext of human rights protection,”135 and human rights “should 
not be used to justify any encroachment on religious holy symbols 
things, cultural values and the identity of a nation.”136 There are 
diverse traditions of interpretation of human rights in particular 
nations, and international human rights should respect this.137 
Thus, while each individual should be protected from any forcible 
imposition of religious convictions and enjoy an “autonomous 
space where his conscience remains the absolute master,” this does 
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not require “religious neutrality” or “indifference” to religion by 
the state.138 While all citizens must be equal before the law 
regardless of their religion, the Russian Orthodox Church teaches 
that a society may freely determine the extent to which the state 
may cooperate with various religious communities, depending on 
their “traditional presence” or “contribution to the history and 
culture of the country.”139 
VI. MODERN DIGNITY 
Many modern conceptions of human rights downplay the 
social embeddedness of the human person and disassociate the 
concept of human dignity from the metaphysical and teleological 
context in which Christian theology and anthropology have placed 
it. Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) conception of human dignity was 
an important part of this development, although in some ways,  
it reflected the imprint of older ideas on his thought.140 In particular, 
his focus on practical reason—even if for the purpose of engaging 
in a critique of it—recalls the long tradition, reflected in Gregory of 
Nyssa, Leo the Great, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Thomas Aquinas, 
that human dignity is intimately associated with our rational 
nature and capacity to make moral choices.141 Kant thus insisted 
that it is only “in so far as it is capable of morality” that humanity 
has dignity.142 Moreover, despite his far-reaching criticisms of 
metaphysics generally,143 Kant developed what he was prepared to 
call a “groundwork” for a metaphysics of morals.144 However, what 
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he meant by metaphysics in this context was not what it had meant 
in medieval philosophy. Kant was insistent that the principles of 
morality are not to be derived from our knowledge of human 
nature, let alone divine revelation, but are rather to be found in 
“pure[ly] rational concepts” known a priori without resort to 
anthropology or theology.145 This metaphysics of morality entailed 
an individualization of human dignity in two correlative ways: first, 
in his concept of each human being as morally “self-legislating,”146 
and second, in his understanding of each human being as an “end 
in itself.”147 For Kant, human freedom is “the key to the definition 
of the autonomy of the will,” and this “autonomy” is “the ground 
of the dignity of . . . human . . . nature.”148 For “the dignity of a 
rational being” consists in its obeying “no law other than that which 
at the same time it itself gives.”149 
Kant’s theory should not be seen as specifically endorsing the 
view that each individual is free to make up his own morality in 
some radically subjective sense.150 On his account, the individual 
does not have the right simply “to do as one chooses,”151 for the 
categorical imperative imposes a duty that binds the rational will 
to act only in a way that treats humanity—in one’s own person as 
well as in the person of any other—as an end, and never as a means 
to some other end.152 However, as Hans Urs von Balthasar has 
observed, although Kant demanded that the other person must 
always be respected, “the absoluteness of the person was anchored 
simply in his ethical freedom” and, consequently, the “fundamental 
interrelatedness of persons” that had been developed within 
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Christian Trinitarian theology was lost.153 It has accordingly become 
increasingly common in contemporary Western societies to focus all 
attention on each human person as an isolated, autonomous 
individual. Such a vision was articulated, for example, by the U.S. 
Supreme Court when it referred to the “right of the individual” to 
make personal choices “central to personal dignity and 
autonomy”—a conception of liberty which at its heart was said to 
involve “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”154 
Likewise, a leading judgment of the Canadian Supreme Court 
adopted—under the guise of “the inherent dignity and inviolable 
rights of the human person”—a conception of freedom of religion 
described to be “personal” and “subjective,” and therefore 
“integrally linked with an individual’s self-definition and 
fulfilment” and “a function of personal autonomy and choice.”155 
Aharon Barak, summarizing a line of decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Israel, has similarly written that human dignity “extends 
to all those activities in which human beings must be recognized as 
free agents, developing their body and mind according their own 
free will.”156 Observing, moreover, that individuals must also live 
within society, he went on to characterize the social context as 
involving “mutual relationships between the individual and other 
individuals, and between them and the state.”157 Notably, however, 
he made no mention of intermediate groups or associations 
between the individual and the state. This idea that human dignity 
is essentially about the realization of one’s authentic self is today 
widespread in Western societies. Many lawyers, as Jeremy 
Waldron has pointed out, simply assume that legal references to 
“dignity” must convey this derivatively Kantian understanding of 
the concept, but one in which self-authenticity has no necessary 
relationship to the morality of one’s choices.158 
Taken to their logical conclusions, such conceptions of 
individual autonomy have four important implications for the 
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concept of human dignity. First, conceiving human rights as 
abstract liberty rights tends to hollow out the concept of dignity. 
Dignity comes to be seen as autonomy, meaning nothing more than 
the right to exercise an array of freedoms in any manner and in 
pursuit of any goals—provided this does not interfere with the 
rights of others. On this view, the concept of dignity is hollowed 
out because it is divested of any essential connection to duty, virtue, 
or teleology, except the duty not to interfere with the rights of 
others. Second, conceiving human rights as abstract equality rights 
tends to flatten the concept of dignity. Dignity comes to be seen as 
equality, meaning nothing more than a right to equal treatment, 
without discrimination, understood in both formal and substantive 
terms. On this view there can be no gradations of dignity,  
no distinctions of honor, deference, or moral expectation accorded 
to persons on the basis of their character, office, or role.  
Third, conceiving of human rights as abstract individual rights tends 
to atomize the concept of dignity. Dignity comes to be seen as 
nothing more than the liberty and equality of the individual 
considered in abstraction from the associations, communities, and 
groups in which each individual is situated. Such groups, 
associations, and relationships are merely constructs of individual 
human choices. Fourth, and most radically, grounding human 
rights in individual choices threatens their expansion into 
expressions of individual will unlimited by the rights of others. For 
when the individual will is absolutized, the end point is Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s will to power—a world in which “man in himself . . . 
possesses neither dignity, nor rights, nor duties.”159 
VII. POSTMODERN DIGNITY 
The writings of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) are a fitting 
place to complete a discussion of the history of human dignity, for 
it is in his theory of the will to power that the very concept of the 
equal dignity of all human beings is rejected as a carryover from a 
medieval and even modernist past profoundly shaped by Christian 
theology and philosophy. In his early and unpublished preface to a 
projected book, The Greek State (1871), Nietzsche mocked all talk of 
the “dignity of man” and the “dignity of labour.”160 The political 
economy of the Greek city states, he pointed out, depended on a 
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multitude of slaves whose forced labor enabled a privileged class 
of citizens the leisure to devote themselves to higher pursuits. 
Nietzsche argued that the modern state was no different, despite its 
professed belief in human dignity and the protection of universal 
human rights. The Greeks, he insisted, had no need for such 
“conceptual hallucinations.”161 They frankly disparaged the utter 
ignominy of labor and organized their societies so that they met the 
physical needs of their citizen elites. Modern societies are similarly 
slavish, Nietzsche argued, but they sublimate this knowledge by 
attaching themselves to such “phantoms” as the “equal rights of 
all,” the “fundamental rights of man,” and the “dignity of work”162 
For Nietzsche, life is a struggle for existence in which only the 
strong survive. Accordingly, “the overwhelming majority must,” 
he argued, “be slavishly subjected to life’s struggle,” so that the 
privileged few can pursue the good life.163 “[A] rainbow of pitying 
love and of peace” may have appeared “with the first radiant rise 
of Christianity,” but an “insatiable craving for existence” lies in  
the essence of every powerful religion.164 “[T]o the victor” he said, 
“belongs the vanquished,” for “[p]ower gives the first right  
and there is no right, which at bottom is not presumption, 
usurpation, violence.”165 The modern state may trumpet the 
“dignity of man,” but its true origin is not justice but rather 
“devastated lands, destroyed cities, savaged men, consuming 
hatred of peoples!”166 In truth, the state concentrates the “natural 
bellum omnium contra omnes”167 of human existence into “a terrible 
gathering of war-clouds,” which are discharged in less frequent but 
more intense conflagrations of violence between nations, for “war 
is just as much a necessity for the state as the slave is for society.”168 
So far from the state being based on the universal “dignity of man,” 
Nietzsche argued that everyone within this “martial society” must 
be subjected to, and become instruments of, the “military genius.”169 
The only “dignity” left to the individual human being lies in being 
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made a “tool” of this genius.170 For “man in himself . . . possesses 
neither dignity, nor rights, nor duties,” but is only a “wholly 
determined being” serving powers greater than himself.171 
It is possible to discern in Nietzsche’s man of “genius” the 
Übermensch of his later writings—the creator of new values within 
the moral vacuum left to modern man by the scourge of nihilism. 
As Andrew Huddleston has argued, Nietzsche wrote of a particular 
kind of dignity, but it was dignity reserved for the few who have 
the will to power—the courage, strength, and determination to 
pursue great things. Only in a very secondary sense can ordinary 
people participate in a kind of derivative dignity by being 
subservient instruments of the extraordinary few who are truly 
worthy.172 Against the teaching of Christianity that “everyone as an 
‘immortal soul’ has equal rank with everyone else,”173 Nietzsche 
thus envisaged an inherently oligarchic culture in which there is a 
“long ladder of an order of rank and difference in value between 
man and man.”174 And Nietzsche was very clear about the 
theological grounds upon which Christianity had taught the 
inherent equality of all men. In his words: 
At the bottom of Christianity is the rancor of the sick, instinct 
directed against the healthy, against health itself. Everything that 
has turned out well, everything that is proud and prankish, 
beauty above all, hurts its ears and eyes. Once more I recall the 
inestimable words of Paul: “The weak things of the world, the 
foolish things of the world, the base and despised things of the world 
hath God chosen.” This was the formula; in hoc signo the 
decadence triumphed. God on the cross—are the horrible secret 
thoughts behind this symbol not understood yet? All that suffers, 
all that is nailed to the cross, is divine. All of us are nailed to the 
cross, consequently we are divine.175 
For Nietzsche, the answer was a transvaluation of values. 
Henceforth, the “good” must be whatever “heightens the feeling of 
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power in man, the will to power, power itself,” while “evil” is 
whatever “springs from weakness.” 176 The most harmful of all 
vices, in his view, is any manifestation of “pity for all the failures 
and all the weak”—that is the very essence of Christianity.177  
The doctrine of the “equality of souls before God” was a 
“falsehood,” and an “explosive concept” that had diverted human 
life from the glorious conquests of ancient Greece and Rome.178 
CONCLUSION 
Nietzsche’s dark vision appears as a sudden rupture in the 
narrative of human dignity sketched in this article. Nietzsche 
plainly rejected what Brian Leiter has called the “egalitarian premise 
of all contemporary moral and political theory—the premise, in one 
form or another, of the equal worth or dignity of each person.”179 
As Andrew Huddleston has put it, “Christian and Kantian worth 
and dignity is something humans have equally and innately. 
Nietzschean worth and dignity, by contrast, is inegalitarian and 
achieved: humans do not have it equally; they must earn it, and 
earn the respect it merits, by what they do.”180 
On this view, Kant’s liberal account of human dignity is on a 
par with the Christian view. However, this is to overestimate the 
distance between Kant and Nietzsche and to mischaracterize the 
difference between Kant and Christianity. As David Cartwright has 
pointed out, while Kant and Nietzsche entertained different 
conceptions of the human will, they both treated the autonomy of 
the will as their “central ethical conception.”181 Both expressed 
disdain for what they conceived to be the Christian ethic of “pity,” 
describing it as an “infection.”182 Pity is pathological, they 
maintained, because it undermines the autonomy of the self. And 
yet, Nietzsche went much further than Kant. He rejected the 
metaphysics upon which Kant continued to rely, albeit tacitly, as 
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Arthur Schopenhauer argued.183 Alasdair MacIntyre has 
correspondingly observed that Kant’s theory is best understood to 
be a “ghost” of an older conception of divine law and human nature 
grounded in a metaphysics and teleology that is alien to the 
prevailing beliefs of modernity.184 According to MacIntyre, 
Nietzsche’s will to power is one of the only two genuine theoretical 
alternatives confronting anyone attempting to understand the 
moral condition of our contemporary culture.185 The other is an 
Aristotelianism in which we “honor others . . . in virtue of 
something that they are or have done to merit the honor.”186 I take 
MacIntyre to have been very deliberate in his language here. 
Human dignity is a basic feature of all human beings by virtue of 
who they “are,” but it is also a function of what they have “done.” 
As Vladimir Lossky once pointed out, our languages lack the 
words and our minds lack the concepts to adequately denote or 
conceive what it means to be a person.187 For there is always, as 
Rowan Williams puts it, “the enormous fact of my being here,” a 
person who is not only the sum of his attributes and experiences, 
but also an active agent who carries those attributes and 
experiences, and who responds, activates, and develops them in 
deliberate ways.188 There is a real question, however, whether our 
modern commitments to human dignity, expressed for example, in 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948),189 will be able 
to survive the “death of God” in our cultures. In an important 
dialogue with Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Jurgen Habermas 
candidly acknowledged that there are real questions to be asked 
whether an entirely secular philosophy can produce or sustain a 
commitment to human rights and human dignity.190 He pointed out 
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that modern Western philosophy has had to recognize its own 
“religious-metaphysical origins,” including the assimilation of 
certain distinctively Christian ideas that have left an enduring  
mark on many of the most important concepts in contemporary  
political and legal thought.191 Elsewhere he also observed that 
postmetaphysical thinking of the kind pioneered by Nietzsche 
“cannot cope on its own with the defeatism concerning reason 
which we encounter today both in the postmodern radicalization 
of the ‘dialectic of the Enlightenment’ and in the naturalism 
founded on a naive faith in science.”192 It will therefore be necessary, 
Habermas conceded, for our societies to make room for the “special 
power” of religious traditions to articulate the powerful moral 
intuitions that are necessary to sustain human dignity, particularly 
in respect of those most vulnerable.193 
From its earliest articulation, Christian reflection on human 
dignity has, with Gregory of Nyssa, affirmed that the “dignity of 
royalty” is a status that belongs to all human beings: the poor no 
less than the rich, the weak no less than the powerful.194 Waldron is 
thus correct to urge us to maintain the ancient link between dignity 
and “noble rank or high office.”195 A kind of “royal dignity” is an 
attribute of all human beings without distinction. As Leo the Great 
taught, all human beings share equally in the “high dignity” of 
being created in the image of God in “goodness and 
righteousness.”196 Human dignity is most fully realized in lives that 
exhibit these qualities. We fail to live to our full potential in our 
fallen state, but we are raised to a double dignity through our union 
with God in Christ.197 Our natural dignity needs to be conjoined, 
therefore, with both knowledge and virtue. As Bernard of 
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Clairvaux put it: while dignity without knowledge is practically 
worthless, dignity without virtue is downright dangerous.198 
Human dignity is also an inherently relational, social quality of 
human beings. We are individuals, but we are persons in 
communion with each other. As Johannes Althusius taught, human 
dignity is realized as human beings engage in mutual 
communication of everything that contributes to social life.199  
And, as Russell Hittinger has explained, every human realizes their 
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